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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ETHICAL DUTY OF COUN-
SEL WHO BELIEVES CLIENT'S WITNESSES WILL COMMIT 
PERJURY. STATE V. MAHONEY, 16 Md. App. 193, 294 A.2d 471 
(1972). 
John Edward Mahoney was convicted of robbery with a deadly 
weapon; the conviction was upheld on appeal.! Subsequently, a 
petition for post-conviction relief was filed in which the defendant 
alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to 
call several alibi witnesses who allegedly would have testified that he 
was home at the time the robbery was committed. 
During the post-conviction hearing, at which time the defendant and 
trial counsel testified, it was revealed that counsel's principal reason for 
not calling these witnesses was his belief that they would commit 
perjury.2 The post-conviction judge concluded that trial counsel had 
been incompetent, and ordered a new trial. 3 The State of Maryland 
filed an appeal maintaining that: 1) Mahoney's trial counsel acted 
properly in not calling the alleged alibi witnesses because the failure or 
neglect of trial counsel in not calling witnesses, even if material, is a 
matter of trial tactics; 2) if such trial tactics are later proved 
improvident, there is still not a denial of effective representation; 3) 
there was no showing that this particular fact situation was tantamount 
to a denial of effective assistance under the Maryland test for 
1. State v. Mahoney, 16 Md. App. 193, 294 A.2d 471 (1972). 
2. Illuminating for purposes of the issue under discussion is the verbal exchange between 
post-conviction judge and John Bell, trial counsel. Id. at 198-200, 294 A.2d at 473, 474: 
[Bell): ... [T]his presented a difficult situation for the defense attorney or any de-
fense attorney but I think it is abundantly clear that while a defense attorney is 
an instrumentality by which the defendant's case is presented to the jury and to 
the Court, the defense attorney cannot take the facts of a case and change them 
substantially, nor can a defense attorney in any way participate in a fraud upon 
the Court or lend himself to any perjury or subornation of perjury from the 
defendant or any other witnesses ... and not to bring any fabrication or lies 
or any other false, spurious, counterfeit facts before the Court or before the jury. 
[Judge): Are you the judge? Are you supposed to make that judgment as to whether 
or not their testimony would be perjured? 
Isn't the jury the judge? Isn't the jury entitled to hear the testimony of the de-
fendant's witnesses and then reach its own judgment as to who is telling the 
truth and who isn't? 
[Bell): I would take the position that I am not going to put on any witnesses, in-
cluding the defendant, who I think is going to give perjured testimony. 
3. The trial court felt the decision by Mahoney's trial counsel not to call the witnesses was 
more than a tactical judgment and thus concluded that "Bell's failure to accede to 
Mahoney's wish 'to have alibi witnesses testify for him* * * deprived * * * [him) of due 
process'; [and) that if Bell 'didn't like the way his client was insisting that the case be 
tried, he should have withdrawn his appearance ... .''' Id. at 200, 294 A.2d at 474. 
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determining competency of trial counsel;4 and, 4) the so-called alibi 
witnesses would not have assisted Mahoney in his defense, as their 
testimony would not have established his whereabouts at the time the 
crime was committed. 
Mahoney contended that his trial counsel was obligated to present all 
evidence available to his defense which was of probative value, unless he 
knew that such evidence was perjured, and that whether such witnesses 
were to be believed was a matter solely for the jury.s Defendant's legal 
conclusion was that he had been denied due process under the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments. 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals approached the controversy 
through the formulation of two issues: 
(1) Whether, in the circumstances of this case, Mahoney's 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of 
counsel and to due process of law were denied him by reason of 
counsel's refusal to call the so-called alibi witnesses to testify on 
his behalf at the trial. 
(2) Whether, in the circumstances of this case, viewed in light of 
the provisions of Maryland Rule BK45 directing that [the] 
post-conviction hearing judge 'make such order on the petition 
as justice may require', counsel's refusal to call the alibi 
witnesses justifies the granting of a new trial. 6 
The Court of Special Appeals held that trial counsel's refusal to call 
the alibi witnesses, even if an improper exercise of judgment, was not so 
prejudicial as to deny the defendant effective assistance of counselor 
due process of law: the defendant's contentions thus did not warrant 
granting a new trial. In reaching its decision, the court noted that no 
showing was made as to what the testimony of the alibi witnesses 
(other than the defendant's mother and sister-in-law) would have been, 
that none of the other alleged alibi witnesses were produced at the 
post-conviction hearing, and that the proposed testimony of the mother 
and sister-in-law would fail to show that the defendant was home at the 
time the crime was committed.? 
While no fundamental disagreement exists with either the reasoning 
used or the conclusion reached by the Mahoney court on the overriding 
issue of effective assistance, a more comprehensive treatment would not 
have been unwarranted. An examination of authorities in a variety of 
jurisdictions provides no scarcity of commentary on the subject. A 
preliminary requirement in affording a client effective assistance of 
counsel is the obligation of the attorney to investigate all sources of 
4. The Maryland test for determining competency of trial counsel is whether, under 
all the circumstances of the particular case, counsel was so incompetent that the accused 
was not afforded genuine and effective legal representation. Green v. Warden, 3 Md. 
App. 266, 269, 238 A.2d 920, 922 (1967). 
5. 16 Md. App. at .201,294 A.2d at 475. 
6. Id. at 202, 294 A.2d at 475. 
7. Id. at 207, 294 A.2d at 478. 
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inquiry suggested by the accused. This is a determinative factor in 
whether counsel has acted properly in failing or refusing to call a 
witness suggested by his client.8 By general consensus, failure on the 
part of counsel (or investigators for counsel) to pursue suggested lines 
of examination, will result in a denial of effective assistance. 9 Once this 
mandatory pre-trial mvestigatIOn procedure has been faithfully exe-
cuted, the judicial trend is to give counsel great latitude in the calling of 
witnesses. Generally, the decision is regarded as a judgment of strategy 
or trial tactics left almost exclusively to counsel.l 0 Even improvi-
dent strategies or poor tactics do not necessarily amount to deficient 
advocacy. I I It has also been stated that the failure to call alleged alibi 
witnesses, where counsel believes their testimony not to be helpful, is 
considered a part of proper trial tactics. I 2 Clearly then, the failure to 
call a non-material witness is not a denial of effective assistance. One 
court has stated that to sustain a claim of inadequate representation by 
reason of failure to call a witness, it must be established that the alleged 
defense witness was material, necessary, or admissible, or that defense 
counsel did not exercise proper judgment in failing to call him. I 3 This 
court therefore implies that within "proper judgment" even a material 
witness can be withheld, the courts on review defining "proper 
judgment." However, other authority, expanding the latitude of 
"proper judgment" and thus limiting the courts on review, states that 
whatever the reason involved, failure to put on the stand material 
witnesses is merely an error of judgment which does not constitute 
denial of effective assistance. I 4 
Though the above analysis clearly supports Mahoney'8 result, what 
should be criticized is the court's failure to have dealt, if only by way 
of dicta, with the underlying sensitive and confusing ethical dilemma 
8. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 210, 449 P.2d 174, 181, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 245 (1969); 
Evans v. Warden, 240 Md. 333, 335-36, 214 A.2d 145, 146 (1965). 
9. Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 577 
(3d Cir. 1971); People v. Perry, 271 Cal. 2d 84, 111, 76 Cal. Rptr. 725, 743 (1969). 
10. Johns v. Warden, 240 Md. 209, 211, 212, 213 A.2d 467, 470 (1965); Shelton v. State, 3 
Md. App. 394, 401, 239 A.2d 610, 615 (1968). Mere tactical errors generally will not in-
voke a finding of incompetency. Gullion v. Warden, 3 Md.' App. 263, 266, 239 A.2d. 
140, 142 (1968); Hall v. Warden, 224 Md. 662, 665-66, 168 A.2d 373, 375 (1961). Further-
more, where a party is represented by counsel, he is not entitled as a matter of right to 
examine witnesses or otherwise participate in the conduct of his trial. Strosnider v. 
Warden, 245 Md. 692, 695-96, 226 A.2d 545, 548 (1967). 
11. Tompa v. Virginia, 331 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1964); Ingram v. Cox, 321 F. Supp. 90, 
92-93 (W.D. Va. 1970); Bray v. Peyton, 290 F. Supp. 593, 594-95 (W.D. Va. 1969); 
Terrell v. United States, 294 A.2d 860 (D.C. App. 1972); Bell v. United States, 260 A.2d 
690 (D.C. App. 1970). 
12. United States v. Dorn, 169 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1959); State v. Crepeault, 127 Vt. 
465, 496, 252 A.2d 534, 537 (1969). 
13. People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 690-91, 452 P.2d 329, 335, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1969). 
14. Tompa v. Virginia, 331 F.2d 552, 554 (4th Cir. 1964); Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 
460 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Churder v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 207, 209 (E.D. Mo. 1968); 
Crowder v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 291, 294 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Hoffler v. Peyton, 
207 Va. 302, 311, 149 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1966). 
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posed: namely, what is the role of an attorney when, in light of all the 
facts at his disposal, he reasonably believes, but does not know for a 
certainty, that material or non-material witnesses for his client will 
perjure themselves? Although, admittedly, the facts of Mahoney lend 
themselves to a strict analysis on the basis of effective assistance of 
counsel, the lurking ethical considerations which the court did not 
discuss were in fact the motivating forces of the appeal. Moreover, the 
ethical problems manifested are representative of the ongoing struggle 
and attendant confusion in defining the balance between active zealous 
representation on the one hand and faithful duty as an officer of the 
court on the other. The case at hand provides an appropriate focus on 
the existing problems and guidelines for an attorney facing a similar 
ethical problem. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar 
Association is recognized by the bench and bar throughout the United 
States as setting forth proper standards of professional conduct. I 5 
Regrettably, however, the Code adds more uncertainty than it does 
guidance to this issue. I 6 The original Canon V of the American Bar 
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics stated that, "A lawyer in 
undertaking the defense of one accused of crime is bound by all fair 
and honorable means to present every defense that the law of the land 
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, 
but by due process of law. "I 7 Likewise, the current Canon VII of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer should 
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law. However, 
Ethical Consideration 7-26 states: 
The law and disciplinary rules prohibit the use of fraudulent, 
false, or perjured testimony or evidence. A lawyer who 
knowingly participates in the introduction of such evidence is 
subject to discipline. A lawyer should, however, present any 
admissible evidence his client desires to have presented unless he 
knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that 
such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured. I 8 
The Code and interpretative cases appear to define "knowing" or 
"should know" in the sense of absolute certainty. If, in a particular fact 
15. The Maryland Kules of Procedure now I-covide that the Code of Professional Respon· 
sibility of the American Bar Association (as set forth in Appendix F of the Rules) is 
adopted as part of state statutory law. MD. R. CIV. P. 1230. 
16. Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's 
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 28 (1966). 
17. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No.5 (1908). The Canons of Professional Ethics, 
adopted in 1908, were added to and amended numerous times until the adoption of 
the Current Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics. The 
Code was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on 
August 12, 1969 to become effective for American Bar Association members on Jan· 
uary 1, 1970. 
18. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, No.7, EC 7-26. 
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situation, this quantum of conviction has been reached, the attorney's 
conduct is clearly defined. Thus, the courts have held an attorney 
responsible under the prohibition of EC 7-26 in the following 
situations: 1) the witness informs counsel of his intent to commit 
perjury;! 9 2) the client tells counsel of his intent to commit perjury;2 0 
3) the client or witness commits perjury while on the witness stand;2 ! 
4) there was reasonable cause to believe the court was being 
defrauded.2 2 
Absent, however, is specific direction from the Code in stating 
proper conduct where reasonable belief but not total certainty exists. Tt 
would appear therefore, that the job of defining the parameters of EC 
7 -26, vis-a-vis the issue here, is left to the individual attorney or to the 
courts on a case-by-case analysis. Conceivably, any particular court 
could include or delete "reasonable belief" from the mandates of EC 
7 -26. This potentially shifting standard may well be a perplexing 
dilemma to an ethically-minded attorney fearing possible later 
repercussions, while at the same time providing an invitation to 
carelessness for others who fear not the dangerous edge. 
Moreover, the problems raised by these vague strata of uncertainty 
go beyond the self-protective interests of the attorney involved. 
Important considerations of the role of counsel in relation to the client 
and the court are also raised. A fundamental belief has existed among 
the bar that the proper role for counsel is zealous defense in spite of 
personal feelings as to guilt or innocence of the client: to do otherwise, 
it is thought, would be "donning the robe of judge and claiming 
membership on the jury.,,2 3 On the other end of the spectrum, the 
Code and bar demand the utmost obligation as an officer of the court. 
This is the classic conflict in the dual role of the advocate. Clearly, the 
conflict is resolved in a "knowing" situation under EC 7-26: the duty 
to represent zealously by using every possible defense under the law is 
preempted by a higher obligation to protect the court from fraud. But 
the disturbing question is whether the same order of priorities is 
justified under circumstances of reasonable belief. If so, the mandates 
of EC 7-26 would, in the present situation, protect the attorney from a 
charge of inadequate representation if he decides to withhold 
testimonial or real evidence. If not, the attorney potentially faces 
condemnation from bench and bar for overreaching his role as counsel 
and thus denying the client effective assistance. 
19. Ingle v. Fitzharris, 283 F. Supp. 205, 207 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
20. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970). 
21. In re Hoover, 46 Ariz. 24, 46 P.2d 647 (1935); In re Palmieri, 176 App. Div. 58, 162 N. Y.S. 
799 (1916); In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 322 P.2d 1095 (1958). 
22. In re Huie, 285 Ala. 185, 188-91, 230 So. 2d 514, 517-19 (1970); In re Griffith, 283 Ala. 
527. 534, 219 So. 2d 357, 359 (1969). In both of these cases disbarment was warranted 
where counsel obtained divorces either knowing or having reasonable cause to believe 
that the parties were not bona-fide residents of the state. 
23. Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F. Supp. 670, 677 n.6 (D. Utah 1966). 
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Although much legal scholarship has been generated in closely 
related areas, the specific ethical problem presented in Mahoney 
remains a singularly gray area in legal ethics, with most discussion 
centering around the situation where the client informs counsel of his 
intent to commit perjury. Those writers who constitute the more liberal 
divisions of the bar on ethical principles believe that their first loyalty is 
to the client.2 4 Members of the bar who constitute the more 
conservative side on ethics consider themselves first of all officers of the 
court, and tend to adopt a literal interpretation of the canons.2 5 While 
there is a consensus among both of these groups that the attorney 
should first try to dissuade the perjuriously-inclined client, opinion 
differs if this proves unsuccessful. A key spokesman of the "left wing," 
Monroe H. Freedman, argued that a lawyer is obligated to exploit every 
means to secure his client's acquittal, and that a declaration by the 
defendant that he would perjure himself should not alter that 
obligation. Freedman claimed that' either withdrawal from the case or 
informing the court of the defendant's intended perjury would only 
shift the ethical burden to another lawyer or judge. Moreover, 
Freedman believed that under the protections and obligations of 
confidentiality, the attorney would have no alternative but to put the 
perjurious witness on the stand without explicit or implicit disclosure 
of the attorney's knowledge to either judge or jury. Freedman would 
thus treat the client as innocent until the court finds him guilty, even 
when the client has admitted his guilt to the lawyer.2 6 
Approaching the problem from the "right wing" was Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, then a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, who 
maintained that the canons are clear in their prohibition against the 
knowing use of perjured testimony.27 In dealing with a client who 
24. Speaking for this group, Charles P. Curtis of the Boston Bar wrote: 
His [the lawyer's 1 loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master. Not the 
Court? you ask.... No, in a paradoxical way. The lawyer's official duty, re-
quired of him indeed by the court, is to devote himself to the client. The court 
comes second by the court's, that is the law's, own command. 
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1951). 
25. The attitude of this group seems to be that the final goal of justice cannot be attained by 
stooping to condone or collaborate in those practices which are endemic to the injustices 
above which men of the law aspire to rise. 
Championing this view has been Lloyd P. Stryker who wrote: 
The standards of conduct that lawyers must obey are as high, and are as gen-
erally followed, as the most exalted rules that govern any men on earth. All advo-
cates are bound by these standards, and they must obey them. They may and 
should fight hard for their clients, but they must fight fairly. They may and should 
say all that honestly and honorably can be said for them. They may say it with 
fervor and all the persuasion in their power; but in saying it they may not deceive, 
they must not lie. 
L. STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY 283 (1954). 
26. Reichstein, The Criminal Law Practitioner's Dilemma: What should the lawyer do when 
his client intends to testify falsely? 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1, 2 (1970), citing Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1471, 1475-76, 1477-78, 1482 (1966). 
27. The Chief Justice stated: "The proposition that perjury may ever be knowingly used is as 
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informs counsel of his intent to commit perjury, Chief Justice Burger 
does not state that a lawyer must inform the court of the intended 
perjury, but he does place severe restrictions on the attorney's 
subsequent conduct. In stating that the lawyer inay not facilitate the 
perjury in any way, he has set forth explicit guidelines.2 8 
The written material that has addressed itself more closely to the 
specific issue of reasonable belief reflects this same conflict among the 
legal community as to the dual client-court obligation. One writer in 
the early part of the century expounded the belief that it is the jury's 
role to determine the veracity of witnesses. While agreeing that counsel 
is precluded from the introduction of evidence known to be false, the 
matter of determining the veracity of witnesses was said to be otherwise 
out of his hands. 2 9 
A more contemporary viewpoint consistent with this approach 
directs attention to the exact problem of conscience. This commentator 
notes that attorneys, although attempting to be objective, cannot help 
but form moral judgments as to the guilt or innocence of clients. 
Realizing this, he urges that counsel should resist to the utmost the 
tendency of this mental and emotional formulation to influence their 
handling of the case.3 0 Responding to the claim among the bar that the 
pernicious as the idea that counterfeit documents can be fabricated and knowingly of-
fered to the Court as genuine. This is so utterly absurd that one wonders why the subject 
need even be discussed among persons trained in the law." Burger, Standards of Con-
duct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 
11, 12 (1966). See also, Bress, Standards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense 
Function: An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM CRIM. L. Q. 23 (1966); Bress, Professional 
Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 MICH.L. REV. 
1495 (1966); and Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confi-
dentiality, 64, MICH. L. REV. 1488 (1966). 
28. Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge's View-
point, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 11, 13 (1966), says: 
In those circumstances, if the lawyer.'s immediate withdrawal from the case is 
either not feasible, or if the Judge refuses to permit withdrawal, the lawyer's 
course is clear: He may not engage in direct examination of his client to facilitate 
the krlown perjury. He should confine himself to asking the witness to identify him-
self and to make a statement, but he cannot participate in the fraud by conven-
tional direct examination. 
See also Braun, Ethics in Criminal Cases: A Response, Q5 GEO. L. J., 1048, 1053 (1967): 
Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 594-95 (1961). 
29. Battle, Tne Defense of a Client Whose Guilt is Known, 4 N.Y.L. REV. 74, 75 (1926). 
The author states: 
[I]t frequently happens that testimony is offered which the counsel may suspect 
to be untrue, but which he does not know to be false. In such event it is his 
duty ... to present this testimony and leave it to the jury to determine its truth 
or falsity. The counsel has no right as such to pass upon the veracity of wit-
nesses. If a witness makes statements and is prepared to testify to them under 
oath, counsel is not justified in withholding such testimony because he may sus-
pect it is not true .... But if the witness tells him the testimony is true, then it 
is his duty to submit that testimony to the jury. 
30. Gold, Split I.,oyalty: An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 14 CLEV.-
MAR. L. R. 65 (1965): 
Belief in a client's cause should not be so overwhelming that the lawyer's enthu-
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jury, and not counsel, should pass on the veracity of a client's story, a 
past president of the American Bar Association has taken the opposing 
stance, assuming a strong court-oriented position. 3 1 He believed it is 
the duty of counsel to know whether his client is guilty in a criminal 
case, and that he should govern his advice and conduct of the case 
accordingly. 3 2 
While the ambiguities of the code of ethics and the disharmony 
among legal scholars pose more questions than answers to the problem, 
fortunately, some direction has been emanating from the courts. 
Although there are no authorities directly holding that "reasonable 
belief" of perjury falls within the prohibition against the knowing use 
of perjured evidence, a number of cases have directed their analysis 
toward that principle. 
One classification of case authority has protected defense counsel's 
efforts at preventing the introduction of potentially perjured evidence. 
In a recent California decision, petitioner claimed denial of effective 
assistance for counsel's failure to investigate allegedly exculpatory 
defense witnesses. The court found no denial of effective assistance 
where the information given to the attorney regarding the proposed 
witnesses was given under such circumstances that counsel reasonably 
believed the testimony would be perjured.3 3 Another California court 
concluded that counsel's failure to call witnesses on behalf of his client 
was justified on two grounds, one of which was that after weighing all 
of the facts, the attorney may well have believed the proposed 
testimony of the witnesses to be false. Supporting this position, the 
court noted that an attorney owes no duty on behalf of his client to 
offer testimony which is untrue.34 Cases have also held counsel's 
siasm creates witnesses ... or should [his 1 disbelief... discourage possible 
witnesses from testifying for a defendant . 
. . . Disbelief and defeatism deny the defendant the right to effective counsel. 
Id. at 72-73. 
31. Buckner, The Trial of Cases, 15 A.B.A.J. 271 (1929) states: 
The client is not entitled to have a lawyer who will permit a witness or client 
to testify to something which the lawyer himself does not believe to be true .... 
. . . I think that if the lawyer thinks that his client or witness is not telling the 
truth he should not be a party to what he believes to be perjury. 
Id. at 273. 
32. "The lawyer should form an opinion as to his guilt or innocence in order that he may probe 
more intelligently into the truth or falsity of the testimony which the client or his friends 
propose to give in court and thus prevent the introduction by himself of false testi-
mony." Id. at 273. 
33. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 202, 211-13, 449 P.2d 174, 182-83, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240, 
246-47 (1969). Here, information was given to counsel just prior to sentencing. Under 
these circumstances, "reasonable belieC' was sufficient to abort the otherwise manda-
tory requirement to investigate all crucial defenses of fact that may be available. While 
stating the general maxims of EC 7-26, the court appears to have expanded in this situa-
tion the concept of "knowing." 
34. People v. Lucas, 1 Cal. App. 3d 637, 642-44, 81 Cal. Rptr. 840, 844 (1969). The second 
and primary ground justifying the decision not to call the witnesses was that counsel 
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disbelief in the veracity of alleged exculpatory witnesses, following an 
investigation, was sufficient ground for deciding not to call them at 
trial. 3 5 Finally, one recent decision has recognized a measure of 
responsibility to the court where the attorney reasonably suspects that 
the client's representations are false. 3 6 
Another classification of authority, addressing itself to the govern-
ment's obligation in the presentation of evidence, has recognized a level 
of responsibility below absolute knowledge of perjured testimony: the 
United States District Court for Maryland has twice spoken to this 
point. In one case, counsel for petitioner argued that in order to obtain 
relief, petitioner need not show that the prosecuting officer had actual 
knowledge that Ithe testimony was perjured; it was sufficient that the 
officer should have known. The court recognized the more severe 
requirement, but decided it was not necessary to pass on that legal 
point.37 In the other case, the District Court held that petitioner's 
allegations that the prosecuting attorney should have known that 
certain testimony was perjured raised factual issues and legal questions 
concerning the state's responsibility for the accuracy of what the 
witness said.38 Other jurisdictions have also recognized this princi-
ple,3 9 and even civil cases have carved a niche of responsibility where 
may have determined legally it made little difference what the witnesses would have 
testified to. Somewhat parallel to Mahoney, the court raised the ethical considerations, 
but ultiniately decided the case according to proper trial tactics. 
35. United States ex rei. Green v. Rundle, 305 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Pa. 1969). The decision 
not to call alibi witnesses was not considered ineffective assistance of counsel where one 
of the reasons for the decision was an investigator's report to counsel that he did not 
believe the witnesses. 
See also In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 415-18, 310 P.2d 15, 20-21, cert. denied, 335 
U. S. 899 (1957). Here, both the attorney and sheriff had investigated the witnesses, 
the attorney concluding they were not, as claimed, present when the crime took place. 
The court concluded that counsel's failures to call the two allegedly exculpatory wit-
nesses because he felt they would perjure themselves, was not a denial of effective as-
sistance of counsel. It is interesting that the lower court judge in this case made essentially 
the same recommendation to counsel as the post-conviction judge did in Mahoney. 
The referee believed the testimony of the public defender but concluded 
that. " [he 1 should have presented a defense which... [he 1 believed was 
false and let petitioner gamble on the chances that the jury might impose a death 
sentence or a life sentence for murder, or might convict petitioner of a lesser of-
fense than murder, or might acquit petitioner. 
[d. at 417-18, 31OP.2d at 2l. 
36. State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 16, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (1970). The New Jersey 
court, in agreeing that an attorney must seek for his client his maximum entitlement 
under the law and not to act as judge or jury, also noted: "It is not an attorney's re-
sponsibility to decide the truth or falsity of a client's representations unless he has 
actual knowledge or unless from facts within his personal knowledge or professional 
experience he should know or reasonably suspect that the client's representations are 
false." Id. 
37. The district court noted that "even if the less severe burden applies, this petitioner has 
not proved any such injury as would bring the rule into play." Smith v. Warden, 254 F. 
Supp. 805, 806 (D. Md. 1966). 
38. McCloskey v. Boslow, 349 F.2d 119, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1965). 
39. Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th CiT. 1951). Here the court recognized the principle 
by stating: "In the case before us there is no suggestion that the prosecuting officers 
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an attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a fraud was perpetrated 
on the court.40 Although the above authority does not directly 
advocate that "reasonable belief" of perjury be put squarely within the 
prohibitions against the knowing use of perjured testimony, it 
represents at least a foundation for the proposition. 
Against the above conflicts and scattering of existing guidelines, 
Mahoney's significance becomes apparent not merely because it exposes 
the vague area under consideration: factually, this case is a classic 
example of the problem. The attorney, after making the required 
investigation of those available witnesses suggested by his client, and 
evaluating all surrounding facts, concluded that it was the apparent 
intention of the relatives to establish some type of false alibi. He 
therefore decided that he could not in good conscience present any 
witnesses whom he considered were intent on proffering perjured 
testimony. This decision was not reached arbitrarily-several factors 
were taken into consideration independent of counsel's investigation of 
the witnesses themselves: 
(1) at the trial, a juvenile accomplice of the defendant testified 
in detail that he, together with John Mahont;!y and brother Will 
Mahoney, committed the robbery; 
(2) a second witness testified that shortly after the robbery, the 
defendant came to his home and admitted the robbery-subse-
quently offering money to the witness to supply him with an 
alibi; . 
(3) a third witness, Mahoney's uncle, told the jury that the 
defendant admitted to him he had committed the robbery; 
(4) both John and Will Mahoney made full confessions to the 
police shortly after their arrest; and 
(5) an admission was made to counsel by defendant's brother, 
Will Mahoney, that the defendant had committed the crime.4 1 
Consequently, the defendant offered no evidence in his defense, and 
the jury found him guilty of armed robbery. 
Counsel's conduct is open to two interpretations which, in 
themselves, mirror the general dilemma. On the one hand, Mahoney is a 
case of an attorney motivated by the highest ethical ideals in protecting 
knew or had reason to believe that any of the testimony offered at the trial of the 
petitioner was false or perjured." Id. at 410. 
Another case, citing Wild, declared that a due process violation had occurred be-
cause the District Attorney should have known of a plea-bargain agreement. The court 
noted that even if the District Attorney did not know of the agreement, he had every 
reason to believe a deal had been made and should have made further inquiry. DeLuzio 
v. People, 494 P.2d 589, 592 (Colo. 1972). 
40. Where attorneys obtained divorces when they had reasonable cause to believe that one 
or both of the parties was not a bona fide resident of the governing state, disbarment 
was held warranted. In re Huie, 285 Ala. 185, 188-91, 230 So. 2d 514, 517-19 (1970); 
In re Griffith, 283 Ala. 527, 534, 219 So. 2d 357, 363 (1969). 
41. 16 Md. App. at 195, 196, 294 A.2d at 472. 
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the court from even the possibility of fraud, while on the other, either 
an attorney diluting his client's case by usurping the jury's role in 
determining the veracity of potential witnesses, or an attorney whose 
services were rendered ineffective because of his own conviction of his 
client's guilt. Arguably, the five factors pointing to the client's guilt 
played a more significant role in counsel's belief of perjury than the 
independent investigation of the witnesses themselves. Assuming this 
belief of perjury was more client-oriented than witness-oriented, an 
argument can be advanced that counsel was rendered ineffective once 
convinced of his client's guilt. To state the proposition another way, 
because counsel believed in his client's guilt, a fortiori, the witnesses 
must be lying.42 The Maryland court was not, by virtue of the facts of 
the case, forced to elect one of these positions. Because Mahoney dealt 
with non-material witnesses, a convenient escape valve was provided. 
The court resolved the case squarely within the sphere of proper trial 
tactics, thus achieving a polite sidestepping of the ethical consideration 
involved. 
Left in limbo at this point is how the court would resolve a similar 
situation where the witnesses are critical to the defense. It is notable 
that authority exists for the proposition that even a material witness 
can be withheld, whatever the reason, once the required pre-trial 
investigation is made.43 If the Maryland courts followed this line of 
42. Although factually distinguishable from Mahoney, Johns v. Smyth, i 76 F. Supp. 949, 
953 (E.D. Va. 1959); and State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 563, 271 A.2d 752, 761 
(1970), provide the underlying theory of this argument. In Johns the attorney repre-
sented an indigent state prisoner convicted of murder. Counsel failed to submit in-
structions covering manslaughter and failed to argue the case to the jury, even though the 
evidence provided by the prosecution suggested some provocation for the act. In exploring 
the reasons for the attorney's failure to pursue these tactics, the court stated: "[Yjou 
could not conscientiously argue to the jury that he [the defendant j should be ac-
quitted?" The attorney responded: "I definitely could not." Johns v. Smyth, supra at 
953. The court held that the failure of counsel for a defendant "to argue the case before the 
jury, while ordinarily only a trial tactic not subject to review, enters the field of incompe-
tency of counsel when the reason... [given for such failure to argue j . .. is the 
attorney's conscience." [d. Thus, the defendant was denied due process because he was 
not provided with effective assistance of counsel. The court in stating its reasons said: 
When the defendant was interviewed by his court-appointed attorney, the at-
torney stated that he had reason to doubt the accuracy of the defendant's state-
ment. It was at this time that the attorney's conscience actuated his future conduct 
which continued throughout the trial. If this was the evidence presented by the 
prosecution, the defendant was entitled to the faithful and devoted services of 
his attorney uninhibited by the dictating conscience. 
[d., citing Johns, Merchant stated: 
[Pjetitioner's counsel in prejudging their client's guilt failed as a consequence to 
pursue the defense of consent or to make an investigation into the reputation of the 
prosecutrix and ... their belief in the improbability if not impossibility of a white 
housewife consenting to intercourse with a negro laborer ... is the equivalent of 
the attorney's "conscience" in Johns and thus removes ... counsel's conduct of 
the defense from the realm of trial tactics and places it in the category of ineffective 
representation. 
State v. Merchant, supra at 563, 271 A.2d at 761. 
43. In Bolden v. United States, 266 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the court stated with regard 
to the failure of counsel to call an alleged alibi witness: "Whatever the reason for it, the 
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reasoning, even a material-witness situation with parallel ethical 
problems could again be resolved according to proper trial tactics 
disregarding any ethical considerations. Thus, the "trial tactics" 
principle, if followed, would safeguard an attorney who decided for 
ethical reasons to withhold a material witness. The question remains, 
however, whether on review, the Maryland courts (unlike the above 
authorities) would delve into counsel's reasons for failing to introduce a 
material defense witness. If so, it would remain uncertain whether the 
court would be satisfied if the sole reason for the attorney's decision 
was an ethical consideration of the type under discussion. In addition, 
because Maryland has neither approved nor disapproved a "reasonable 
belief" standard, an attorney faced with a decision either to proffer or 
to withhold evidence which he reasonably believes will be perjured 
would only be guessing whether his conduct will receive acceptance or 
condemnation. The ethical struggles raised in Mahoney are a prelude to 
these unresolved problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The often antagonistic roles of zealous advocate and dutiful officer 
present significant tensions for the criminal defense lawyer. Even if it is 
true, as has been suggested ,4 4 that most attorneys today agree that the 
ultimate responsibility of counsel is to the court, the difficulty would 
lie in determining at what point the superior loyalty to the bench 
should come into play to the potential compromise of the client's 
interests. The resolution of this ethical dilemma recommended by the 
post-conviction judge, that counsel withdraw from the case, merely 
postpones the inevitable, for each succeeding individual will be faced 
with the same difficulty.45 It is suggested that counsel's motives in 
Mahoney were admirable and exemplify the highest principles in the 
practice of law; however, whether one applauds or criticizes counsel's 
actions, whether one agrees or disagrees with a "reasonable belief" 
measure of responsibility, and whether one perceives a subtle expansion 
of EC 7-26 emanating from the courts, one fact is apparent: the need 
for judicial guidance. If the courts reserve to themselves the right to be 
decision was for the judgment of counsel and should not now be the basis for a charge of 
inefficiency. Thus, there is no merit to this position of petitioner's claim." ld. at 46l. 
In addition, with regard to the failure to call witnesses, one court has said: "the failure 
to produce and put on the stand material witnesses is merely an error of judgment which 
does not constitute lack of effective representation of counsel." Hoffler v. Peyton, 207 
Va. 302, 311, 149 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1966). See also cases cited note 14 supra. 
44. Stovall, Aspects of the Advocate's Dual Responsibility, 22 ALA. LAW. 66, 68 (1961). 
45. Brief for appellant at 7, State v. Mahoney, 16 Md. App. 193, 294 A.2d 471 (1972). 
See also Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1476 (1966). 
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the final arbiters of professional conduct for members of the bar in 
Maryland, then it is the courts who must actively seek to aid lawyers in 
defining proper ethical conduct where the code or case law has been 
vague or silent. Failure to do so leaves at best no guidelines for those 
concerned practitioners faced with a similar ethical situation, and, at 
worst, a temptation for others to exceed proper bounds of professional 
conduct. State v. Mahoney represented an opportunity lost for such 
guidance. 
Richard S. Miller 
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AUTOMOBILE 
SEARCH ON POLICE LOT HELD VALID DUE TO EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES. SKINNER V. STATE, 16 Md. App.116, 293 A.2d 
828 (1972). 
In Skinner v. State,1 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
upheld a conviction for receipt of stolen goods and possession of heroin 
and controlled paraphernalia.2 The defendant was discovered in an 
attempt to cash a stolen check at a bank, and thereafter fled to a 
waiting car. A description of the defendant and the car was reported to 
the police, who relayed it to a patrol unit, which in tum stopped the 
defendant's car in an apartment parking lot. 
After. locking his car, the suspect was taken to the police station, and 
his car was towed to headquarters where officers secured a warrant 
authorizing its search. In dealing with the constitutionality of the 
search of the car in the police garage, the Skinner court stated: 
The search is constitutionally unassailable. With scrupulous 
regard for their suspect's 4th Amendment protections, the 
[police] did more than they were required to do. Their effort, 
in terms of its constitutionality, is like Portia's quality of 
mercy, "twice blest." 
.. " [A]t the moment when [one of the officers] saw the 
[defendant's] automobile pull onto the parking lot ... he ... 
had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained 
fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime. We are further 
satisfied that the exigency of the situation would have justified 
an immediate warrantless search of the automobile there upon 
that parking lot.3 
1. 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972). 
2. This note will not deal with the exception to a search warrant due to a bona fide inventory 
search. A jury verdict of statutory common nuisance, also not dealt with in this note, was 
reversed. Skinner v. State, 16 Md. App. 116, 293 A.2d 828 (1972). 
3. 16 Md. App. at 118-1~ 293 A.2d at 830-31 (1972). 
